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ABSTRACT

Network security is an ongoing major problem in today’s Internet world. Even
though there have been simulation studies related to denial of service and cache
attacks, studies of attacks on real networks are still lacking in the research. In this
thesis, the effects of cache attacks in real information-centric networking systems
were investigated. Cache attacks were implemented in real networks with different
cache sizes and with Least Recently Used, Random and First In First Out algorithms to fill the caches in each node. The attacker hits the cache with unpopular
content, making the user request that the results be fetched from web servers. The
cache hit, time taken to get the result, and number of hops to serve the request
were calculated with real network traffic. The results of the implementation are
provided for different topologies and are compared with the simulation results.

ix

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The rise of Internet of Things (IoT) and the Internet being the primary source for
exchange of information over the network has exploded in recent years. Informationcentric networking is noteworthy in that it offers benefits such as improved efficiency, better scalability in bandwidth demand and better robustness. Improved
efficiency is obtained with the temporary user data store in the cache and hence information centric network depends on caching for its implementation. Much of the
research in the network security field concerns theoretical and simulation results.
However, the results of network simulation often do not reveal problems that will
affect the final result. Therefore, the primary focus of this research is to compare
the result of a cache attack on a simulation with one on a real information centric
network (ICN).

Information centric networks (ICNs) have pulled in considerable interest of recent
researchers in computing [14, 20, 31, 37]. The major topic of research has been
focused on the use of data caching to improve the performance of the network.
However, research on security concerns of data caching is still lacking. An example
of a scenario that lacks security could be a mobile ad hoc network (MANET), a
self-organized network system without any secured infrastructure.

The effects of a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on simulated ICNs have been studied
in [27]. The main goal of the attacker was to fill node caches with unpopular
content, impeding caching in the ICN without increasing the likelihood of getting
–1–

detected. The attack originated from a malicious node that requested unpopular
content at regular intervals. The decreased throughput and increased delay also
led to higher energy consumption by the nodes of the ICN, thus reducing overall
performance of the network. Using a network simulator, it was found [27] that
such an attack was moderately successful against small scale networks. However,
the potency of the attack rapidly decreased and became ineffective as the network
size increased. In this research, Random, FIFO and LRU replacement policies were
used to implement the cache attack considered different cache sizes and topologies.
It is found that the attack was more effective against a First In First Out (FIFO)
in comparison to a Least Recently Used (LRU) replacement policy.

1.1

Problem Statement

ICNs rely on caching to increase the performance of the network, thereby reducing the number of hops needed to respond to a query. ICNs have evolved from
host-centric to content-centric, and the main problem in data exchange is content
caching. The authors in [27] tested a DoS attack against a simulator that simulated
ICNs with various network topologies. The attack was found to be more effective
for smaller networks. But testing the effects of a DoS attack on the caches of a
real ICN is currently missing from the literature and is an open problem. In this
work, such an attack is tested over small real ICNs. Specifically, the scalability
and effectiveness of a DoS attack on real ICNs is compared to those obtained from
the simulator in [27].

–2–

1.2

Research Objective

The research initially started as a study of caching-related issues in ICNs. Being
a comparatively new research area, most of the research on ICNs has focused on
efficient routing and cache management policies to enhance the performance of
ICNs (e.g. [42, 44, 48, 49, 63]). There has been much less research done on attacks
related to caching. Motivation for this work came from [18], where the authors
focused on detecting cache pollution attacks in Named Data Networks (NDNs).
The paper proposed a new method for launching a denial of service (DoS) to attack
NDNs and also proposed ways to improve cache pollution attacks. The concepts
and methods specified by [18] for NDNs were used in this work for ICNs. Our
main goal for this work was to develop a method for performing a DoS attack on
real small ICNs ranging from 5 to 20 nodes and on different topologies including
path and mesh topology.

–3–

CHAPTER 2

Background and Existing Research

In this chapter, the key concepts and definitions related to caching attacks in
networking systems are discussed in order to understand the implementation of
the proposed cache attack in real ICNs.

2.1

Information Centric Networking (ICN)

An ICN focuses on content objects that can be accessed or cached anywhere in
the network rather than solely from the end hosts. The use of ICNs has become
more prominent in recent times since 2010 due to heavy Internet traffic flow. With
the evolution of the Internet from being host-centric to being network-centric, ICN
aims to provide in-network caching to deliver content efficiently. The main reason
to shift from host-centric to content-centric or information-centric networking is
that the Internet is currently focused on delivering high volumes of digital data
(e.g. 3D, 4D, movies, pictures) to users. The users need only the content of the
data and are not interested in the source location.

Being a comparatively new research area, and most of the ICN research has focused
on improving routing [7, 14], and not as much research on issues related to security
and privacy [1, 20] of ICN. In [1], the researchers briefly discussed types and impacts
of ICN attacks and how the attacker depends on the ICN attributes to perform
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the attack. The impact of security requirements and the severity levels of attacks
were also clearly stated with the solutions.

As shown in the Fig. 2.1, ICN communication takes place hop-to-hop from the
user to the server or to the nearest hop to fulfill the user request.

Figure 2.1: ICN Communication Model
The authors in [20] provided a brief assessment of DoS and distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attacks and suggested a few possible countermeasures. The authors
identified new types of DoS-based attacks, which can impact an ICN network
interest flooding and content/cache poisoning and provided a brief discussion of
their effects and countermeasures.

The researchers in [20] also discussed the privacy risks of ICN caching and continued investigating to the extent by which the nearby user, in the role of an
–5–

adversary, has requested the content and they proposed a solution to reduce such
attacks. In [43], the authors presented a framework for delivering content in ICNs
securely and with high availability.

In [58], the authors proposed a secure naming system that allows decoupling content authentication from its location in a network. The benefits of the proposed
methodology in [58] are security of mapping functions between high-level names
and cryptographic identifiers at the network level, authentication of the content
with its provider regardless of the location from where it was retrieved, reduction
of possible threats during the resolution procedure [20].

2.2

Cache attack

The cache memory is the temporary memory shared by multiple processes. The
cache is accessible by the user and the attacker. This temporary memory is used to
store the content invoked by the user for any requests to improve the efficiency for
the future requests. Thereby if the user requests such content, it will be fetched
directly from the cache itself or by the nearby hosts without reaching the web
server to fetch the user data. A caching attack is defined as the filling of the cache
with some random data.

Although simulation results are available that compare the performance of a caching
attack in the ICN [27], there are no experimental results that evaluate the performance of cache attack on real ICNs. That is the focus of this research.

–6–

2.3

Related work

A considerable amount of research has proven the effectiveness of using data
caching to increase performance, but research on the implementation of data
caching in real networking systems and foiling attacks is still lagging behind.

2.3.1

Motivation for this Research

In designing a secure network, research involving the software simulation of attacks
is not enough, and there have been experiments to test and compare simulation
results with that on real network systems.

In [2, 3], firewalls and VPNs produced different results in real networks when compared to prototypes and virtual modeling software because the simulation results
were not based on real network traffic.

In [38], the authors have performed a comparison between analytical and simulation
research on ad hoc wireless networks.They identify factors in wireless networks like
hills, obstacles, link asymmetries, and unpredictable fading not encapsulated by a
simulator.

In [12], the researchers stress the need to test “Internet protocols under varied conditions to determine whether they are robust and reliable". Specifically, they mention the following necessary simulation scenarios every network simulator should
–7–

capture:
1. Network topologies that define links and their characteristics.
2. Traffic models that specify sender and receiver locations and demands.
3. Network dynamics that include node and link failures
The researchers of this paper developed a common network simulator platform to
encompass various scenarios on which other researchers can test various networking
protocols. However, they concluded that their simulator still lacked aspects of a
real network. These aspects may include:
1. Developing mechanisms for the successful integration of code from the user
community; and
2. Developing tools for large-scale simulations with a diverse traffic mix.
These could only be captured by experimenting over real networks.

The researchers of [8] also identify shortcomings of network simulators. They
point out that wide-area testbeds and custom simulators though valuable, have
significant shortcomings which can only be studied through real networks. These
approaches often lack the wide mix of network traffic and topologies found in real
networks. Also, the repetition of experiments under controlled conditions can be
difficult to expose the real network traffic.

The researchers in [5, 62] point out the importance of performing real experiments
over simulations for neural networks. In particular, while using simulators, the
experimental design chosen for the neural network training set can have a very high
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impact on the predictive accuracy achieved by the simulator. Hence simulation
results become limited in their accuracy.

These differences in results were the motivation for this research work. It has been
attempted to test and compare results produced by [27] over a simulator to that
of real ICNs. This attempt is made to investigate whether the cache attack indeed
produces the same effect over real ICNs in presence of factors that are not present
in a simulator, e.g. network traffic, delay in packet transmission due to network
bandwidth, web-based viruses, etc.

–9–

CHAPTER 3

Implementation of Real ICN

In this research, cache attacks have been implemented over real information centric
networking systems. To better understand the research, the technologies used in
ICN network implementation are discussed in detail in this chapter.

3.1

Tools Used for Network Implementation

Technologies (tools) described in this section have been used to implement ICNs
in this research work; these technologies are also used to implement a broad array
of other networks.

3.1.1

Content Delivery

Content delivery is the service of copying the pages of a website to geographically
dispersed servers and when the page is requested, dynamically identifying and
serving page content from the closest server to the user, enabling faster delivery [29,
51, 54, 59, 60]. Content delivery works by placing cache servers at main access
points around the world and using a routing code such as Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP), which redirects the request for the web page to the closest server.
– 10 –

When a user clicks on the URL, which is content enabled, the content delivery
network reroutes from the originating server to the cache server which is closest to
the user. The cache then determines if the requested content exists in the cache
server and then serves that content. If the content is new then it is retrieved from
the web server and cached locally.

3.1.2

Squid Web Proxy Server

Squid (software) is a web proxy server daemon supporting HTTP, HTTPS, FTP and
many more [10, 23, 25, 39, 56]. It is responsible for caching and reusing frequently
requested web pages and thereby helps in reducing the response time. It also helps
in caching web, DNS and other computer network lookups for groups of people
sharing network resources. In order to optimize network throughput, Squid routes
content requests to servers in many different ways to build cache server hierarchy.
Squid is used by Internet service providers to increase network speed to their
customers and also to LANs that share their Internet connection. Because of its
proxy nature, which filters network traffic, it provides security and anonymity.
The configuration file to configure the Squid server is given in Fig. 3.1.

$vi/etc./wgetrc;
$cd /var/squid/squid.conf
Figure 3.1: Squid Configuration

– 11 –

3.1.3

Wget Function

GNU Wget (Wget) is a software package for retrieving content from web servers. It
supports downloading files from HTTP, HTTPS and FTP protocols as well as retrieval
through HTTP proxies [36, 45, 46, 47, 55]. It is a non-interactive command line tool
that can easily invoke scripts and fetch data. Some of its advantages include robustness, recursive download, portability and support for proxy. The configuration
file for Wget is given in Fig. 3.2.

$vi /etc./wgetrc
Figure 3.2: Wget Configuration

Wget can be invoked by a simple command line whose basic syntax is given in
Fig. 3.3.

$wget [option] · · · [URL] · · ·
$wget https://www.unf.edu/
Figure 3.3: Wget Invoke

3.1.4

Rsyslog

Rsyslog is open-source software used on UNIX-like operating system for transmitting log messages in an IP network. It is helpful for logging information and
– 12 –

accepting inputs from different sources and transforming and outputting the results to different destinations, thus supporting both local and remote logging [13,
19, 26, 40, 53]. Every logged message contains a timestamp, a hostname field and
a program name field. Rsyslog supports precise timestamps and writing directly
to databases. Rsyslog is also used for implementing DoS attacks: a programmer
could flood the Rsyslog daemon with Syslog messages resulting in the log files
consuming all the remaining space on the file system [17, 30]. Some of the features
of Rsyslog include excellent security and modular design. The configuration file
for Rsyslog is given in Fig. 3.4.

$cd /etc/rsyslog.conf
Figure 3.4: Rsyslog Configuration

3.2

Implementation Methodology

In the real network, the ICN was initially set up with the cache and web servers.
This setup allows the user to access or fetch data from the web server. The user
request will be sent as query to the server, which then will be served by a nearby
cache or the web server based on content availability. The basic steps in the
methodology were:
1. Implement caching networks over nodes.
2. Implement querying for documents over the networks.
3. Assuming one or more nodes are compromised, implement the attack and
evaluate the change in performance of the networks.

– 13 –

3.2.1

Overview of the Implemented ICNs

In this sub section, we provide an overview of the implemented ICNs on which we
have tested the effect of the cache attack.

The two ICNs (with 4 and 8 nodes) implemented for this research worked exactly
the same way as shown in the example of Fig. 3.5. The ICN in Fig. 3.5 contains 8
nodes. The last (rightmost node) is the web server that would contain all files the
user would request.

Figure 3.5: Overview of the ICNs

In network terminology, such a web server that owns a particular file, is called the
custodian of that file. In the ICN of Fig. 3.5, the 7 remaining nodes could be users
querying for files. Each of these nodes will have its own cache that stores any file
relayed via that node. One such node in the ICN (the leftmost node) is designated
as the user for illustration. When the user generates a query for a file, the query
– 14 –

propagates through all the nodes in the route. The file is searched for in the cache
of any intermediate node in the path. The query is answered if the file is found in
the cache of any of these nodes. If not, the query is answered only after reaching
the web server, which then relays back the file via the intermediate nodes to serve
the request. These intermediate nodes will store the file in their respective caches.
The idea of ICN as mentioned before is a distributed system of nodes that would
decrease the response times for queries using caches. It is expected that the next
query for the same file by any user will not have to propagate to the web server,
but will be catered by one of the intermediate nodes (being found in its cache).
This way, the average response time for the ICN is reduced, enhancing the overall
performance of the network.

3.2.2

Specification of the Implemented ICNs

Each node in the ICNs contains a hash table to direct a query to the next hop to
serve the user’s request. The network topologies considered in this research were
line and mesh. Detailed description of these topologies are given in Chapter 4. In
the real world (e.g. videos of Youtube), some documents (files in our case, and
videos in case of Youtube) have much higher popularity over others. For example,
some videos in Youtube have over a million views, while there are others with less
than 10 views. It is well known that web content request popularity follows a
Zipfian-like distributions [11, 24, 33, 34, 35, 61]. The file popularity level in this
work was assumed to follow the same Zipfian distribution. The common values
considered in the Zipfian distribution are usually chosen as α = 0.65 and α = 0.85.
Since the change in alpha value will have the same difference ratio, α = 0.65 has
been used throughout this experiment. The caches of all the nodes will be empty in
– 15 –

the initial phase, and thus a warm-up test was carried out to fill the caches before
experimental results were calculated. Parameters used to measure performance
were:
1. Average number of increase in hops for queries.
2. Average delay for each request in the network.

For each user’s request, Dijkstra’s algorithm [32] is used to find the shortest path
to the custodian which could be either the cache of an intermediate node in case
of a popular file, or the web server (if the file is not found in the cache of any
intermediate node in the path). The cache sizes considered in this research are 10
MB and 40 MB, and the number of nodes considered are 4 and 11. For experimental
purposes, the ICN with 4 nodes is considered as a small network and the ICN with
11 nodes is considered a mid-sized network. In this work, the effect of the cache
attack on both these ICNs with the real network traffic and firewall in place is
compared to the results stated in [27] for networks of same sizes over the simulator.

3.2.3

Idea of the Performed Cache Attack

The goal of the attacker is to feed caches of all nodes in the ICN with extremely
unpopular content (files in this case) and therefore render every user’s request
unavailable in the cache forcing it hop till the web server. Hence the time taken
for each request (query) will be more, increasing the average response time for
query for the ICN, and reducing its efficiency. The assumption is the attacker
has control over one or more nodes in the ICN from which the attacker generates
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queries for extremely unpopular contents periodically in order to fill in the caches
of the intermediate nodes with these unpopular contents. The node(s) controlled
by the attacker is (are) called compromised node(s).

This cache attack is performed on the both the ICNs (with 4 and 11 nodes) with
one compromised node. Then the same attack is repeated with two compromised
nodes for both the ICNs, and also with four and eight compromised nodes for the
ICN with 11 nodes. To recall, according to [27], in the large network, the impact
of cache attack was less whereas in the smaller network, the impact was higher.
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CHAPTER 4

Testbed Setup

In this chapter, we illustrate the experimental setup in details. At the onset, we
define some terms that we use throughout in this thesis.

4.1

Terminologies Used
• Nodes: Nodes are defined as any machine in the network (ICN).
• Requester Nodes: These are the nodes that would periodically request data
(files) in the network (ICN). Requester nodes are also referred to as users or
user nodes in this work.
• Attacker Nodes: These are the nodes that would periodically request extremely unpopular data (files) in the network (ICN). Attacker nodes are also
referred to as compromised nodes in this work. The intent of the attacker as
mentioned before is to fill out caches with unpopular content.
• Web Server: This node contains all files the requester nodes would request.
This node is also referred to as a custodian node in this work.
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4.2

Cache Setup

The code that accomplishes any cache activity such as filling the data in the cache
and fetching the content has been written using Python scripting language. The
open source Squid web proxy has been installed in every node including the web
server. The cache proxies contents were stored in the main memory and ensured
that the system was not shut down during the experiment.

The experiments were made without attacker and with 1 and 2 attacker(s) were
implemented on both the ICNs with 4 and 11 nodes. Additionally, experiments
with 4 and 8 attackers were performed with the ICN with 11 nodes (caches). The
user sends a HTTP request as shown in the Fig. 4.1, which then seeks the content
on the caches of the intermediate nodes in the path, and then onto the web server
(if the content was not found in any of the caches of the intermediate nodes).

Figure 4.1: Squid Cache Setup with Web Server
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Each node was allocated a static (specific) IP address throughout the experiments.
The caches were stored in the main memory of each node, and therefore by default, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is invoked to assign new IP
addresses to the nodes each time the ICN is restarted [6, 21, 22, 41, 50]. To implement static IP address configurations, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCP) was disabled and a static IP address was defined for each node as shown
in Fig. 4.2.

$vi /var/log/squid/ip.txt
192.168.103.205 cache 0
192.168.103.206 cache 1
192.168.103.207 cache 2
192.168.103.208 cache 3
192.168.103.209 cache 4
192.168.103.209 cache 5
192.168.103.209 cache 6
192.168.103.209 cache 7
192.168.103.209 cache 8
192.168.103.209 cache 9
192.168.103.209 cache 10
192.168.103.209 cache 11 / webserver
Figure 4.2: Static IP Address Definitions

The following entries were added at the end of the configuration file to disable
DHCP, and the file was saved as shown in Fig. 4.3.
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# disable ipv6
net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6 = 1
net.ipv6.conf.default.disable_ipv6 = 1
net.ipv6.conf.lo.disable_ipv6 = 1
Figure 4.3: Entries to the Configuration file
4.3

Firewall Configuration

The Linux IPtable configuration file was used to define the incoming and outgoing
ports to accept or deny incoming content. This is the process which secured the
network and monitored the traffic flow within the network. Also the use of the
firewall differentiates the experimental results from simulation results (of [27]),
since this experiments involve real network traffic. The configuration file for the
firewall is shown in Fig. 4.4.

$cd var/log/squid/iptables.config
$cd var/log/squid/squid.config
Figure 4.4: Firewall Configuration

4.4

Web Server Setup

One of the nodes was considered to be the web server where all the files were
stored. Squid proxy was set up in the web server as well. The files in the web
server could be fetched from any other node per the user request using the wget
function. As shown in Fig. 4.5, the first line defines the web server with an IP
address of 192.168.103.254. The next line is a query for the file file1 requested
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from this web server. The attacker also used the same technique to fetch files and
populate caches of other nodes with unpopular content (files).

$192.168.103.254 cache 11 / webserver
$wget http://192.168.103.254/file1
Figure 4.5: Web Server Setup

4.5

Topology Definition

The two topologies considered were path and mesh topology. Path topology is
defined as the path of order n that has n vertices denoted by Pn [15]. Among these
two topologies, the mesh topology exhibits the real world scenario. But in a full
mesh topology, every node of the network is connected to every other node. In an
ICN, however this is not feasible since this defeats the purpose of caching (since
every node becomes a neighbor of the web server). Therefore to better represent an
ICN, a partial mesh network has been implemented and used for the experiments.
Both these networks were implemented to compare results of the simulation of [27]
with those of real ICNs. As shown in the Fig. 4.6, the caches were built on each
work station (node) along with the web server. In this topology, the user request
and the attacker request will be generated at random. The network is full duplex.

Fig. 4.8 and Fig. 4.7 show the representation of the partial mesh topologies with
4 and 11 nodes respectively used in this work.
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Figure 4.6: Path (Pn ) Topology

Figure 4.7: Partial Mesh Topology with 11 Nodes

In the partial mesh topology, each node has at least two neighbors [52]. An exception to that has been made in Fig. 4.8, where the web server is connected to
only one node. Each user request will use the Dijkstra’s algorithm [32] to find the
shortest path to fetch the file either from the cache of another node (including its
own cache), or from the web server in case the cache of any intermediate node does
not contain the requested file.
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Figure 4.8: Partial Mesh Topology with 4 Nodes

4.6

4.6.1

Hardware and Software Specifications

Hardware Specifications

For this research work, all the caches/nodes had the same configuration as described in Table 4.1.

4.6.2

Software Specifications

Linux flavor Ubuntu14.0 AMI was mounted on the workstations. Java JDK version
1.7 was installed, along with Python 2.6. The firewall was configured using Linux
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Operating System

Gnome Ubuntu 16.04

Processor

Intel Core 2 Quad Q9300 2.5 GHz x4

OS Type

64 bit

Memory Size

3.7 GB

Disk Size

28.2 GB
Table 4.1: Hardware Configuration

IPtable. Squid open source proxy was installed on every node (including the web
server node). Squid configuration file was configured in each node to specify the
node and the next hop, thereby implementing line and partial mesh topologies.
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CHAPTER 5

Results and Analysis

Once the ICN was set up with the line or partial mesh topology, the system was
ready to implement the cache attack on the ICN. The smaller network consisted
of 4 nodes and the larger network consisted of 11 nodes.

In [27], the researchers found in a simulation environment that the attack was
considerably more effective with FIFO replacement policy over LRU and random.
In this research therefore LRU, Random, and FIFO policies have been used to
compare the results with [27]. There were a fixed number of files with a fixed size
for each experiment scenario. The popularity of each file was assigned based on
a Zipfian distribution with a Zipfian α value of 0.65. This α is the most common
Zipfian value. Another common value of α, (0.85) has been used in [27] for very
large networks of more than 100 nodes, which were not considered in this research
(due to lack of resources).

It is to be noted, since the value of α remains constant throughout the set of
experiments, the same set experiments performed with a different value of α will
only change numerical results, but not the overall conclusions obtained the experiments. The results of using a different value for α will thus be numerically but not
qualitatively different, although a fixed value of α = 0.65 has been used in these
experiments.
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5.1

Evaluation Scenarios

Once the popularities of the files were set with the given Zipfian distribution α
value, the effectiveness of the attack and the average time taken for the ICN to
respond to a request without and in presence of attacker(s) was measured. For
this research cache sizes of 10 MB and 40 MB were chosen. The different values of
parameters used for both path and partial mesh scenarios are given in Table 5.1.

5.2 Pn ICN Results

In the Pn ICN scenario, the rate of requests from the normal and attacker nodes
are the same. The aim of this scenario was to compare the results obtained out
of this experiment with a similar scenario of [27]. This scenario also proves the
attack to be possible on a real ICN and thus establishes its validity.

Parameter
Policy
#nodes
Cache size
File size
#files
% of unpopular files
#attackers

Values
LRU, Random, FIFO
4, 11
10MB, 40MB
1MB
400
120%
0, 1, 2, 4, 8

Table 5.1: Parameters for both Pn and Partial Mesh ICN

As stated in Table 5.1, each of the replacement policies LRU, FIFO, and Random
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were tested in this scenario. The ICN with 4 nodes was tested with 0, 1, and 2
attackers, and that with 11 nodes was tested with 0, 1, 2, 4, and 8 attackers. Additionally, going by the results of [27], the number of unpopular files each attacker
can request has been fixed at 120% of the cache size in MB. Therefore with a cache
size of 10MB, the attacker requests at least 12 popular files, and with a cache size
of 40MB, the attacker always requests at least 48 popular files. The total number
of files used in the experiments is 400.

In this section, we present the results for the following parameters as listed in
Table 5.2 for illustration and discussion.

Parameter
Policy
#nodes
Cache size
File size
#files
% of unpopular files
#attackers

Values
LRU
4
10MB, 40MB
1MB
400
120%
0, 1, 2

Table 5.2: Parameters for P4 with LRU

In Fig. 5.1, the effect of cache attack in the P4 ICN nodes is illustrated.
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Figure 5.1: P4 ICN with LRU

All result sets were obtained after the initial warm-up that fills the cache with
random data. As is exhibited in Fig. 5.1, it is found that the impact of the cache
attack appears to increase with the increase in the number of attackers, since the
response time for requests increases with the increase in the number of attackers.
This result is consistent with [27] for the same parameters thus validating this
attack on a real ICN.

Another result of experiments with the P11 is also illustrated. The parameters for
that is specified in Table 5.3.

In Fig. 5.2, the effect of cache attack in the P11 ICN is illustrated.
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Parameter
Policy
#nodes
Cache size
File size
#files
% of unpopular files
#attackers

Values
LRU
11
10MB, 40MB
1MB
400
120%
0, 1, 2, 4, 8

Table 5.3: Parameters for P11 with LRU

Again as is exhibited in Fig. 5.2, it is found that the impact of the cache attack
appears to increase with the increase in the number of attackers for the P11 ICN.
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Figure 5.2: P11 ICN with LRU
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Additional results of the Pn ICN scenario has been put in Appendix A.1.

5.3

Partial Mesh ICN Results

In this section, we present the results for the partial mesh ICN. The following
parameters as listed in Table 5.4 for illustration and discussion.

Parameter
Policy
#nodes
Cache size
File size
#files
% of unpopular files
#attackers

Values
LRU
4
10MB, 40MB
1MB
400
120%
0, 1, 2

Table 5.4: Parameters for Partial Mesh ICN for 4 Nodes with LRU

In Fig. 5.3, the effect of cache attack in the P4 ICN is illustrated.

All result sets were obtained after the initial warm-up that fills the cache with
random data. As is exhibited in Fig. 5.3, it is found that the impact of the cache
attack increases with the increase in the number of attackers, since the response
time for requests increases with the increase in the number of attackers. This result
is consistent with [27] for the same parameters thus validating this attack on a real
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ICN.
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Figure 5.3: Partial Mesh ICN with 4 Nodes with LRU

Another result of experiments with the partial mesh ICN with 11 nodes is also
illustrated. The parameters for that is specified in Table 5.5.

Parameter
Policy
#nodes
Cache size
File size
#files
% of unpopular files
#attackers

Values
LRU
11
10MB, 40MB
1MB
400
120%
0, 1, 2, 4, 8

Table 5.5: Parameters for Partial Mesh ICN for 11 Nodes with LRU
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In Fig. 5.4, the effect of cache attack in the partial mesh ICN with 11 nodes is
illustrated.
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Figure 5.4: Partial Mesh ICN with 11 Nodes with LRU

Again as is exhibited in Fig. 5.2, it is found that the impact of the cache attack
increases with the increase in the number of attackers for the P11 ICN.

Additional results of the partial mesh ICN scenario has been put in Appendix A.2.
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5.4

Comparison with other Simulation Results

Fig. 5.5 shows the trends of similar experiments conducted in a simulator over a Pn
ICN with comparable parameters. These trends are extremely similar to Fig. 5.1.

Figure 5.5: Simulation on a Pn ICN

Comparing the trends of Fig 5.5 and Fig 5.1, the difference in the beginning is due
to the fact that no cache was used in the starting point by [27] for the experimental
scenario of Fig. 5.5, while caches of size 10 MB were used at the starting point in
this work. This validates the fact that the simulation results could be replicated
in the real world, and it confirms that this cache attack is a threat for ICNs.
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5.5

Comparison of Trends over Different Cache Replacement Policies

Next the effect of the cache attack has been compared for different cache policies
on both kinds of ICN. In particular, Fig. 5.6 compares the effect of the cache attack
on a path network topology of P11 with cache replacement policies LRU, FIFO, and
Random. For each replacement policy, the percentage increase in average response
time for requests with 0 attackers and 8 attackers respectively with cache sizes 10
MB and 40 MB have been reported in the plots. As is observed from Fig. 5.6, the
effect of the cache attack is the most for FIFO, and the least for LRU replacement

% increase in Response Time

policy for the Pn ICN.

25
20
15
10
5
10

40

LRU

FIFO

Random

Figure 5.6: P11 ICN

Fig. 5.7 compares the effect of the cache attack on the partial mesh network of 11
nodes with cache replacement policies LRU, FIFO, and Random. Again, for each
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replacement policy, the percentage increase in average response time for requests
with 0 attackers and 8 attackers respectively with cache sizes 10 MB and 40 MB
have been reported in the plots. As is observed from Fig. 5.7, the effect of the
cache attack is again the most for FIFO, and the least for LRU replacement policy
for the Pn ICN. But one difference here is for a cache size of 40, the difference in
effect between the policies is more pronounced in the partial mesh ICN than the
Pn ICN. This is probably due to the complicated topological structure of the mesh

% increase in Response Time

network over the line network.
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Figure 5.7: Partial Mesh ICN with 11 Nodes.

LRU has been found to be the best policy in various different network settings in
different research works (e.g. [4, 9, 57]). Therefore the performance of LRU policy
against the cache attack is not surprising. In [27], simulation also had shown
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similar results proving LRU as the best replacement policy .

The response time in the network is an important factor that includes the transmission delay (Delay or latency is the time taken for a unit of data to be transmitted
across a network link) to the destination, the processing time at both source and
destination, the delay along the path, and the transmission time back to the source.
The difference in the average response time has been seen in the real ICN from
this experiment which were similar to the simulator results.
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CHAPTER 6

Conclusions and Future Work

6.1

Results Summary

This research work focused on testing real time ICN systems to determine the
results on the real network and to compare the same with the prior simulation
results [27] on the effect of a cache attack on such systems (this work was mentioned
as a future research direction in [27, 28]). During the experiments we discovered
other factors affecting network performance which had previously gone unnoticed
in simulations. The factors include network traffic, delay in packet transmission
due to network bandwidth, web-based viruses, and an attack on a web server which
has no backup server. These were the factors considered in this experiment which
uses the laboratory networking system.

The result trends were almost the same as those in the simulations even after
considering the real network factors which proves that the cache attack had high
impact in the smaller network and was less effective for larger ICNs.

6.2

Implementation Challenges

To set up the laboratory network, an information centric network initially consisting of four caches was set up and preliminary results were obtained. The cache was
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stored in the main memory under the assumption that the system power would
never go off. Unfortunately, during a hurricane, the building lost its power and
the research setup was disturbed. All the IP’s also changed because by default IP
addresses were dynamically assigned. The entire cache setup with the web server
was rebuilt again, this time with the static IP addresses. Therefore, the recommendation to for future researchers is to use static IP addresses for the nodes during
this experiment.

6.3

Future Research Directions

This research can be further extended by evaluating the performance under cache
attack of larger (30 or more nodes) ICNs in the public cloud such as Microsoft Azure
or Amazon Web Services. Further, the results can be repeated with the addition
of smarter attacking techniques, which considers the wait time (e.g. characteristic
time [16]) for each attack to flood the cache with unpopular content. In this
research, since wait time was not considered even if the attacker hit the cache with
zero time interval, it did not affect performance but merely raised the number of
attacks on the ICN. This study extended the results of cache attacks in simulated
networks to real ICNs, and will be helpful for further advancing research in real
networking systems.
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APPENDIX A

Additional Results

A.1

Pn ICN

Parameter
Policy
#nodes
Cache size
File size
#files
% of unpopular files
#attackers

Values
FIFO
4
10MB, 40MB
1MB
400
120%
0, 1, 2

Table A.1: Parameters for P4 ICN with FIFO

Parameter
Policy
#nodes
Cache size
File size
#files
% of unpopular files
#attackers

Values
FIFO
11
10MB, 40MB
1MB
400
120%
0, 1, 2, 4, 8

Table A.2: Parameters for P11 ICN with FIFO
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Figure A.1: P4 with FIFO
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Figure A.2: P11 with FIFO
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Parameter
Policy
#nodes
Cache size
File size
#files
% of unpopular files
#attackers

Values
Random
4
10MB, 40MB
1MB
400
120%
0, 1, 2

Table A.3: Parameters for P4 with Random

2 Attackers
1 Attacker
0 Attackers

Response Time [S]

4
3
2
1
0

0

10

20

30

Cache Size [MB]
Figure A.3: P4 with Random
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Policy
#nodes
Cache size
File size
#files
% of unpopular files
#attackers

Values
Random
11
10MB, 40MB
1MB
400
120%
0, 1, 2, 4, 8

Table A.4: Parameters for P11 with Random
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Figure A.4: P11 with Random
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Partial Mesh ICN

Parameter
Policy
#nodes
Cache size
File size
#files
% of unpopular files
#attackers

Values
FIFO
4
10MB, 40MB
1MB
400
120%
0, 1, 2

Table A.5: Parameters for Partial Mesh ICN for 4 nodes with FIFO
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Figure A.5: Partial Mesh ICN with 4 nodes with FIFO
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Policy
#nodes
Cache size
File size
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% of unpopular files
#attackers

Values
FIFO
11
10MB, 40MB
1MB
400
120%
0, 1, 2, 4, 8

Table A.6: Parameters for Partial Mesh ICN for 11 nodes with FIFO

6

Response Time [S]

5
4
3
8
4
2
1
0

2
1
0

0

10

20

30

Attackers
Attackers
Attackers
Attacker
Attackers

40

Cache Size [MB]
Figure A.6: Partial Mesh ICN with 11 nodes with FIFO
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Policy
#nodes
Cache size
File size
#files
% of unpopular files
#attackers

Values
Random
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10MB, 40MB
1MB
400
120%
0, 1, 2

Table A.7: Parameters for Partial Mesh ICN for 4 nodes with Random
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Figure A.7: Partial Mesh ICN with 4 nodes with Random
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Policy
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File size
#files
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#attackers

Values
Random
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10MB, 40MB
1MB
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Table A.8: Parameters for Partial Mesh ICN for 11 nodes with Random
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Figure A.8: Partial Mesh ICN with 11 nodes with Random
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